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Objection: ‘Despite the common impression that joint action needs to be dumbed down for infants due to their ‘‘lack of a robust theory of mind’’ ... all the important social-cognitive building blocks for joint action appear to be in place [...]’
‘I ... adopt Bratman’s (1992) influential formulation of joint action or shared cooperative activity.
‘for an activity to be considered shared or joint each partner needs to intend to perform the joint action together ‘in accordance with and because of meshing subplans’ (p. 338) and this needs to be common knowledge between the participants’
Carpenter, 2009
Inconsistent Triad #1
1. joint action fosters an understanding of minds;
2. all joint action involves shared intention; and
3. a function of shared intention is to coordinate two or more agents’ plans.
‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’
Bratman, 2011 p. 11
Hypothesis (Carpenter): One- and two-year-olds have shared intentions as characterised by Bratman.
Prediction: They should be capable, at least in some minimally demanding situations, of coordinating their plans with another’s.
Paulus et al, 2016 figure 1
Paulus et al, 2016 figure 2B
‘3- and 5-year-old children do not consider another person’s actions in their own action planning (while showing action planning when acting alone on the apparatus).
Seven-year-old children and adults however, demonstrated evidence for joint action planning. ... While adult participants demonstrated the presence of joint action planning from the very first trials onward, this was not the case for the 7-year-old children who improved their performance across trials.’
Paulus et al, 2016 p. 1059
‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’
Bratman, 2011 p. 11
Hypothesis (Carpenter): One- and two-year-olds have shared intentions as characterised by Bratman.
Prediction: They should be capable, at least in some minimally demanding situations, of coordinating their plans with another’s.
Warneken et al, 2014 figure 1A
Warneken et al, 2014 figure 2
Warneken et al, 2014 figure 3
‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’
Bratman, 2011 p. 11
Hypothesis (Carpenter): One- and two-year-olds have shared intentions as characterised by Bratman.
Prediction: They should be capable, at least in some minimally demanding situations, of coordinating their plans with another’s.
What is shared intention?
Functional characterisation:
shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining
Constraint:
Inferential integration... and normative integration (e.g. agglomeration)
Substantial account:
We have a shared intention that we J if
‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …
‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’
(Bratman 1993: View 4)
Mismatch:
Bratman’s account of joint action
vs
1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities
Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1A
Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1B
Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1C
Meyer et al, 2016 figure 2
Meyer et al, 2016 figure 3
‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’
Bratman, 2011 p. 11
Hypothesis (Carpenter): One- and two-year-olds have shared intentions as characterised by Bratman.
Prediction: They should be capable, at least in some minimally demanding situations, of coordinating their plans with another’s.
Gerson et al, 2016 figure 1B
Gerson et al, 2016 figure 3
‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’
Bratman, 2011 p. 11
Hypothesis (Carpenter): One- and two-year-olds have shared intentions as characterised by Bratman.
Prediction: They should be capable, at least in some minimally demanding situations, of coordinating their plans with another’s.
Inconsistent Triad #1
1. joint action fosters an understanding of minds;
2. all joint action involves shared intention; and
3. a function of shared intention is to coordinate two or more agents’ plans.