In conclusion, ...
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So let me conclude.
The challenge we have been addressing was to understand the emergence of
mindreading.
Initially this seemed straightforward: you learn this from social
interaction using language as a tool (compare Gopnik's theory theory).
However, the discovery that abilities to track beilefs exist in infants
from around 7 months or earlier initially suggested a different picture:
one on which mindreading was likely to involve core knowledge. But, as
always, things are not so straightforward.
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Children fail A-tasks
because they rely on a model of minds and actions that does not incorporate beliefs.
Children pass non-A-tasks
by relying on a model of minds and actions that does incorporate beliefs.
The dogma of mindreading (momentary version): any individual has at
most one model of minds and actions
at any one point in time.
There is also a developmental version of the dogma: the developmental dogma is that
there is either just one model or else a family of models where
one of the models, the best and most sophisticated model,
contains all of the states that are contained in
any of the models.
Now we have all the ingredients for a solution.
Finding: infant belief-tracking processes rely on minimal models of the mental.
Therefore: infant belief-tracking processes rely on the same processes that
underpin automatic belief-tracking in adults.
Non-A-tasks measure responses driven (or dominated) by automatic processes.
Therefore: Success on non-A-tasks could be a entirely consequence of automatic belief-tracking
processes.
Therefore: infants should pass non-A-tasks.
A-tasks measure responses driven (or dominated) by nonautomatic processes. Therefore: Success on
A-tasks requires non-automatic belief-tracking processes; it could not be entirely consequence of
automatic belief-tracking processes. Therefore: infants should fail A-tasks.
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The model of minds and actions underpinning automatic mindreading process does not
significantly change over development.
