A Dual Process Theory of Mindreading
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Start with a simple causal model.
‘response 1’ is a variable representing which response the subject will give.
[Which values it takes will depend on what sort of response it is (e.g. a verbal
response, proactive gaze, button press.)
We can think of it as taking three values, one for correct belief tracking,
one for fact tracking, and one for any other response.]
‘process 1’ and ‘process 2’ are variables which each represent whether a certain
kind of mindreading process will occur and, if so, what it’s outcome is.
And the arrows show that the probability that response 1 will have a certain value is
influenced by the value of the variables process 1 and process 2 (and by other things
not included in the model).
So it should be possible to intervene on the value of ‘process 1’ in order to
bring about a change in the value of ‘response 1’.
[I’ve used thicker and thinner arrows informally to indicate stronger
and weaker dependence. Strictly speaking the width has no meaning and this model
doesn’t specify exactly how the values of variables are related, only that they are.]
Of course, much the same is true for ‘response 2’ as well. It’s just that
the changing the values of other variables will have different effects on
the values of ‘response 1’ and ‘response 2’.
[Limit: this depiction ignores time, which is of course critical.]
We must avoid a false assumption about the relation
between types of response and kinds of process ...
So what does a Dual Process Theory of Mindreading claim?
The core claim is just this:
Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (core part)
Two (or more) mindreading processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.
First, the conditions under which one or another response type tracks beliefs should vary.
1.a E.g. changing the **instructions** should reduce the probability that responses
of one type will track beliefs without much affecting the probability that responses
of the other type will track belief.
Evidence for this includes studies by Schenider et al
1.b Or, e.g., changing the **content of the belief** to be tracked from location to
identity, say, should reduce the probability that responses of one type track beliefs
without much affecting the probability that responses of the other type will track beliefs.
Evidence for this includes studies by Low and his collaborators.
1a+b. And, ideally, it should be possible find different conditions that reduce the
probability that different responses track beliefs.
Further, the probability that responses of these two types track beliefs should be
differently affected by factors such as time pressure and cognitive load. (It isn’t
important that either is entirely unaffected; what matters is just that the effects are
different.)
As far as I know we don’t yet have direct evidence for this, because few studies
have compared what happens to two response types as factors like time pressure
or cognitive load are varies.
There is, of course, some evidence that responses of some types are less susceptible
to cognitive load than others (e.g. Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson (2010) on L1 VPT).
So far I’ve been working with a simplifying assumption about the relation
between types of response and kinds of process.
To illustrate, take the case where we instruct subjects to track the location
of a ball.
Subjects are asked to press a button to indicate whether a ball is present or absent.
We know that button selection will not track beliefs when subjects are not
under time pressure.
But what happens if we increase time pressure.
It is possible that increasing time pressure will very slightly, but perhaps
measurably increase the probability that button presses
are dominated by a different mindreading process, one that is less sensitive to
instructions. In that case, we would expect to observe slightly more
belief tracking in the responses as time pressure is increased.
Todd, Cameron, & Simpson (2016) have recently demonstrated this type of effect
for L1-VPT; as far as I know, it has not yet been demonstrated for belief tracking.
So what does a Dual Process Theory of Mindreading claim?
The core claim is just this:
Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (core part)
Two (or more) mindreading processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.
The model of minds and actions underpinning automatic mindreading process does not
significantly change over development.
By contrast, the model of minds and actions underpinning nonautomatic mindreading process
does significantly change over development.
In the first three or four years of life, nonautomatic mindreading processes involve
relatively crude models of minds and actions, models which do not enable belief tracking.
What changes over development is typically just that the model underpinning nonautomatic
mindreading becomes gradually more sophisticated and eventually comes to enable belief
tracking.
Conjecture:
\item Automatic and nonautomatic mindreading processes both occur from the first year of life onwards.
\item The model of minds and actions underpinning automatic mindreading process does not
significantly change over development.
\item In the first three or four years of life, nonautomatic mindreading processes involve
relatively crude models of minds and actions, models which do not enable belief tracking.
\item What changes over development is typically just that the model underpinning nonautomatic
mindreading becomes gradually more sophisticated and eventually comes to enable belief tracking.
Low et al, 2014 figure 2
There is what Low et al’s results are really showing us.
(Low, Edwards, & Butterfill, 2020, p. figure 1)
(Low et al., 2020, p. figure 2)
(Low et al., 2020, p. figure 3)